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ABSTRACT
This paper investigates the recent behavior of the Kelihos botnet, a spam-sending botnet
that accounts for many millions of emails sent each day. The paper demonstrates how a team
of students are able to perform a longitudinal malware study, making significant observations
and contributions to the understanding of a major botnet using tools and techniques taught
in the classroom. From this perspective, the paper has two objectives: encouragement and
observation. First, by providing insight into the methodology and tools used by student
researchers to document and understand a botnet, the paper strives to embolden other
academic programs to follow a similar path and to encourage such discovery. Second, the
paper shares observations and insights gathered about the botnet’s recent spam activity
showing evidence of the “spam as a service” model and demonstrating a variety of unique
and dangerous spam campaigns conducted via the Kelihos botnet, including banking trojans,
credential phishing, and ransomware attacks.
Keywords: Kelihos, Botnet, Malware, Spam, Ransomware, Banking Trojan, Pharma, Pump
and Dump, Geo-Targeting
1. INTRODUCTION
While the Kelihos botnet first debuted in
2009, the current botnet is a functional deriva-
tive of two other famous botnets, Waledac,
and the Storm Worm [Adair, 2012, Bureau,
2011]. The Kelihos botnet is known by a
number of aliases in the community includ-
ing Hlux and Slenfbot [Singh et al., 2014].
Kelihos evolved and became sophisticated
over time, but no interruption could stop the
working of Kelihos. Two widely celebrated
takedowns of Kelihos have been performed by
security companies. The first was Operation
b79, conducted by Microsoft in September of
2009 [Nadji et al., 2013]. In March of 2012,
CrowdStrike, Dell Secureworks, Kaspersky,
and others sinkholed 100,000 nodes of the
Kelihos.B malware [Kerkers et al., 2014]. At
RSA Conference 2013, CrowdStrike demon-
strated a repeat performance, targeted Ke-
lihos.C [Rossow et al., 2013, Werner, 2013].
Despite these admirable attempts, Kelihos
continues to send significant volumes of spam
on a daily basis [Stringhini et al., 2014]. Even
after all of the takedown attempts, Kelihos
was still ranked as the top spam-sending bot-
net in 2015 and continues to yield a signifi-
cant spam volume today [McAfee, 2016, Tech,
2016].
The Kelihos botnet utilizes a peer to peer
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network infrastructure that hides the loca-
tion of the true command and control server
[Dietrich et al., 2013]. Kelihos-infected com-
puters communicate with one another and
are used in two primary ways, depending
on whether they have a publicly reachable
IP address or not. Nodes which cannot be
addressed from the Internet just send spam.
Internet addressable nodes help to anonymize
the location of the C&C server by acting as
a multi-tiered proxy, receiving requests for
spam details from spamming nodes, and re-
questing those same details from other nodes,
eventually leading to a job server which is
leased infrastructure and communicates with
the C&C server, as documented by Fortinet’s
Kyle Yang at BlackHat [Yang, 2012].
The most unique aspect of Kelihos is the di-
versity in its spam and its delivery mechanism.
The spam diversity is primarily because Keli-
hos provides “spam as a service” offering the
use of its spamming infrastructure for hire to
deliver any messages for a sender who is will-
ing to pay their fees. The spam messages are
dominated by pharmaceutical spam, but are
not limited to it. Pharma spam seems to be
the fall-back position, when other higher pay-
ing customers have not hired the botnet to
deliver something else. Kelihos has been ob-
served sending spam for pump and dump ma-
nipulation of different stock symbols, money
mule job applications, and credential phish-
ing for Polish and French financial institu-
tions. In the summer of 2016, Kelihos began
geo-targeting for email delivery sending dif-
ferent messages and payloads based on the
country-code Top Level Domain (ccTLD) of
the email recipient (’.pl’,’.uk’). Malware, in-
cluding ransomware and Zeus banking tro-
jans, were delivered only to certain geogra-
phies using this technique. Kelihos has been
seen spamming ransomware, sending Wild-
Fire [Arora & Warner, 2016b], CryptFile2
[Arora & Warner, 2016a] and Troldesh [Arora
& Warner, 2016f] encryption ransomware fam-
ilies.
Another addition to the spam campaign
is sending links to a Word document that
will drop a variant of Zeus, specifically, geo-
targeting for German and United Kingdom
banks. In the current iteration, it uses stolen
SMTP credentials to login as a legitimate
user to a large number of mail servers and
sends spam.
2. NETWORK
Figure 1. Courtesy: Kyle Yang outlining Kelihos
distribution network [Yang, 2012]
Although the division of the botnet’s oper-
ation appears to be clear in Figure 1, the path
is actually complex. Starting from the bot-
tom, the chart displays the worker or client
nodes, which sends spam to the end user and
only communicate to the servers at the proxy
level. The proxy level is the most interesting
one as it connects with other proxies, clients,
and job servers. This 3-way communication
makes it the most attractive and the one that
contains maximum information. The proxy
level receives templates from other proxies
and also communicates with the job servers.
While Kelihos-infected Windows computers
serve as the proxy and worker nodes, job
servers are leased hardware controlled by the
criminals. Job servers are the ones that serve
as the main operators to the command and
control center. Job servers are often in dis-
guise and try to be invisible under the shadow
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of different proxies; thus, making detection
extremely complex and difficult. Lastly, the
command and control center is handled by
the bot herder and provides the information,
spam templates, and updates needed to be
distributed across the botnet.
3. INITIALIZATION
In this section, researchers will describe the
pattern that is followed by the Kelihos bi-
nary to initiate, then communicate to its
command and control center and eventually
send spam. The process will be illustrated
with screen captures from OllyDbg and Wire-
shark. The details are shared so that they
can be easily replicated by any individual
who has expertise with OllyDbg. The fol-
lowing analysis was performed in a virtual
environment (VMWare) operating in NAT
network mode.
3.1 Processes
In the subsequent section, researchers will
describe the process of how a Kelihos binary
performs when we try to self-infect. The pre-
liminary observations can be viewed with the
help of programs such as Wireshark, Process
Hacker, and OllyDbg 2.0 version. Next, we
will explain the process of self-infecting with
a complete description of the process as de-
picted in Figure 2. As soon as we launch the
binary, it initiates and starts a child process.
Once the child process gets fully activated, it
terminates the parent process and starts the
communication process. Initially, it tries to
make a TCP connection with several Internet
Protocol (IP) addresses which are hard-coded
in the binary. There is a unique identifier in
the message that helps to authenticate the
communication coming from the Kelihos bi-
nary. Once a connection is established, it
makes a request for configuration (config)
files. The config files contain the information
about the spam template and the email ad-
dresses to be used for sending spam messages.
Figure 2. Architecture of Kelihos Malware
3.1.1 Parent Process
In the following sub-section, researchers will
demonstrate some breakpoints in OllyDbg
that are helpful in performing the analysis.
To attain optimum results, the following steps
should be followed in the order mentioned.
After introducing a Kelihos binary into
the virtual environment, start Process Hacker
and OllyDbg as an administrator. Next, open
the Kelihos binary in OllyDbg. Now, one
can see a process being activated in Process
Hacker. The following breakpoints should
be enabled under the Executables (E) tab of
OllyDbg:
1. Ntdll.dll
(a) RtlReportSilentProcessExit
(b) NtTeminateProcess
(c) NtResumeThread
2. kernel32.dll
(a) Resume Thread
Figure 3. Breakpoints for Parent Process
The researchers provide the specific break-
points in Figure 3, so that the results may be
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easily replicated. Once we start debugging
the program, it will stop at the breakpoints
in the following manner:
1. RtlReportSilentProcessExit
2. NtTerminateProcess
3. RtlReportSilentProcessExit
4. NtTerminateProcess
5. ResumeThread
6. NtResumeThread
The process is complicated, but this
method seems to obtain the maximum infor-
mation from the parent process before mov-
ing to the child process. This child process
can be observed in Process Hacker. The tim-
ing of when to attach to the child process
is crucial, if one does it before or after the
following steps mentioned above, the desired
result may not be obtained. Next, we attach
the child process in a new OllyDbg window
with administrative rights.
3.1.2 Child Process
Once the child process is attached success-
fully, we check the Executables (E) box and
set a breakpoint in the child process at the
following location displayed in figure 4.
1. kernel32.dll
(a) Virtual Protect
Figure 4. Breakpoints for Child Process
By setting a breakpoint on ker-
nel32.VirtualProtect, we can pause the
malware execution only after the code has
been unpacked. One way to understand this
unpacking is to observe the DLLs listed in
the Executables window in OllyDBG. Before
running to the next breakpoint, there are
only four DLLs under the Executable section,
as shown in Figure 5.
After the execution pauses at the Virtual
Protect breakpoint, we can see in figure 6,
that the number is significantly greater than
what was observed previously.
Figure 5. Pre-loaded Dlls at Virtual Protect
break
Figure 6. New DLLs loaded shown in Red
Next, the binary will decrypt itself and
then proceed towards its communication
channel.
3.2 Preparing for Take-Off
This section demonstrates a decoding loop
that is run across the code within the binary.
Figure 7 displays a certain memory address
with non-human readable content.
Figure 7. Encrypted Text
After applying this decoding function at
the same memory location, displayed in Fig-
ure 8, now the same memory location con-
tains readable ASCII code that will be used
to request a configuration file from a peer
node, displayed in Figure 9. The request is
accompanied by NET SERVER WORKER
ID and an IP address.
After decrypting and activating itself, the
binary again stops at Virtual Protect to take
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Figure 8. Function Call used for Decryption
Figure 9. Decrypted text of the binary
care of some unfinished business. It loads
nine new DLLs to perform internet related
activities, as displayed in Figure 10. This
behavior can be inferred because downloaded
DLLs are related to wpcap, dhcp, and tcpip.
Wpcap provides network intercept capabili-
ties to the Kelihos binary, which is part of
the method for gathering new user ID and
password pairs for FTP and SMTP email
traffic that are later used by other nodes for
spamming and creating temporary internet
file storage on stolen web servers.
Figure 10. Nine new DLLs loaded by Binary
To reiterate, there has not been any inter-
net communication or activity so far in the
process.
3.3 Communication
In this segment, the communication channel
will be discussed in detail; reaching out to its
peers, establishing a connection, getting the
config files, decrypting the config files and
preparing them to send spam messages.
3.3.1 First Communication
From now on, we will require simultaneous
monitoring of the network traffic which will
be performed by Wireshark in the demo case.
The initial communication starts immediately
after the child process takes control of the
operation after loading the required DLLs
for proper working of the malware. During
our research, it was found that the binary
uses a particular command at a precise lo-
cation to communicate with its peers. We
concluded that there were approximately 145
hard-coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses
that the malware tries to reach out in sets of
five each. The precise location can be found
under the Memory (M) tab as shown in figure
11 and 12.
1. MSWsock.dll under second section
(a) NtDeviceIOControlFile at location
- 7530616E
Figure 11. Location under MSWsock
Figure 12. Breakpoints under MSWsock
The location may vary due to using dif-
ferent machines, but the last four digits will
remain constant. When performing the steps
one can add 616E at the end of the location of
the starting point of the MSWsock.dll. Once
c© 2017 ADFSL Page 13
CDFSL Proceedings 2017 Kelihos Botnet: A Never-Ending Saga
you set the breakpoint at the following ad-
dress, debug the program. The program will
stop at the place with the function call:
MOV EBX, EAX
This is the location where the IP address
gets stored before making a Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) connection. The
value is stored in hex in the EAX registry
and can be confirmed with Wireshark. As
soon as the call is made, Wireshark displays
a TCP connection request to the IP in the
EAX registry. This can be viewed in Figure
13.
Figure 13. Proof of Hard-coded IP address
Since we knew the IP address from the
Wireshark connection (77.123.63.149) it can
be safely assumed that the IP is hardcoded in
the binary. When we visited the hex address
in the EAX Registry and checked for the
value in ’0E76D1F8’ location it contained:
Hex 4D 7B 3F 95 to IP 77.123.63.149
This is the first check done by Kelihos
binary to the following IP address, based on
the hard-coded IPs in the binary. The binary
attempts to establish the connection with
the IP addresses one by one in the hope of
securing a connection with one of them. In
almost all cases, the binary is able to establish
connection with one of the 145 IP addresses.
If it is not able to establish the connection,
it falls back to a list of hard coded domains
to try and establish a connection. A list of
these domains are shown in the figure 14.
The dominant ones are ‘gorodkoff.com’ and
‘goloduha.info.’ During the past year, Pas-
Figure 14. List of the Fast Flux domain names
sive DNS systems at Internet Identity (IID)
recorded 3,261 distinct IP addresses used
by goloduha.info. The researchers’ monitor-
ing station was observed by IID resolving
gorodkoff.com, goloduha.info, and zavodchik-
shop.com at least once during each month
from July 2016 through December 2016, prov-
ing that our “proxy node” was being used as
part of the Fast Flux hosting.
3.3.2 Second Communication
Once the initial TCP connection is estab-
lished with one of the IP addresses, the binary
tries to initiate a 164 bytes encrypted conver-
sation with the IP address. The consistent
thing in the communication is the presence
of string ’lUUE..H@’ at the starting of the
message in the first 12 bytes, as depicted in
Figure 15. This is the unique identifier that
is used to confirm that Kelihos binary indeed
sends the communication. Before this com-
munication gets sent, it makes the following
call:
Nt Device IO Control File 753044EE
The location can be found by the same
manner as you found the previous loca-
tion. In this case, you add ’44EE’ to the
MSWsock.dll location and put a breakpoint
at the following address. One may notice
that the function call is the same, but it is
the address which is the key here. Therefore,
one has to be careful about the address be-
cause the function call is mentioned in ten
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other places in the binary when searched in
OllyDbg. Once the call is made, it uses ’WSA
Send’ to send the initial communication.
Figure 15. Initial communication with unique
identifier ’lUUE..H@’
Next, it waits for a reply from the con-
nected IP; in case it does not receive a re-
sponse, it moves on to the next IP and per-
forms the same process over and over again.
Finally, it uses ‘WSA Receive’ when the bi-
nary can establish a connection and then it
receives a consistent string of 227 bytes.
Figure 16. Olly Socket Trace displaying the back
and forth communication
Next step, the binary sends a reply and
communicates back and forth exchanging per-
tinent information with the established IP
connection about how to obtain the config
files. The information is encrypted, but the
network communication can be viewed in
Wireshark and can be confirmed with a spe-
cial plugin named ’Olly Socket Trace,’ being
displayed in Figure 16.
3.3.3 Third Communication
This is the most important section of the
communication cycle. The section includes
the process of receiving the encrypted config
files and then displaying the decryption of
the config files into the various fields of ‘To,’
‘From,’ ‘Subject’ and ‘Email Body’ for the
spam template.
After the above communication is estab-
lished, the binary requests to receive config
files. For the following, we would need to
continuously monitor Wireshark and for bet-
ter results of the experiment use the filter
‘http.request.method == GET.’ The binary
uses HTTP protocol, as shown in Figure 17,
to request for config files with the usage of
the ‘GET’ command.
GET /file.htm HTTP/1.1
Figure 17. Some examples of GET config file
request
Figure 18 displays a list of different ‘.html’
file names that are used to obtain various
GET config files:
Figure 18. GET config files
After the files are received, the process of
decrypting the data starts. Multiple levels of
decoding, involving six to seven permutations,
are used to convert the encrypted text into
readable text. Figures 19 and 20 will give a
more picturesque view of the commands use
to decrypt the files and the decoded text.
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Figure 19. Encrypted Text of Spam Template
Figure 20. Encrypted text being decrypted with
the function call
3.3.4 Fourth Communication
Figure 21. Spam template formation
Spam Template obtains information of the
spam to be sent from different parts, as can
be viewed in Figure 21 . The executable
assembles everything and packages it before
sending it out. The different categories that
the executable stores information are:
• Fnames From username
• Fdomains From domain name
• From and To email addresses
Once the spam template is created, the
executable sends an SMTP message in order
to check whether it is allowed to send email
or whether it is being blocked.
3.3.5 Fifth Communication
After all the procedures are verified, the mal-
ware is ready to spam and spread evil to the
entire world. The spam volume is quite high,
often sending 1,000 emails in less than 15 to
20 minutes.
4. SPAM PRODUCTS
This section outlines the individual spam
campaigns and explains the purpose and tar-
get market of the spam messages. Figure 22
helps in explaining it properly.
4.1 Pharma Spam
Pharma spam is the most dominant spam
type sent by Kelihos and is the most con-
sistent. It is spammed for ninety percent of
the time during the year. During 2015, Ke-
lihos started initially with the “Dr. OZ &
Oprah Winfrey” spam, where it promised the
best performance enhancement pills for men
and skin care and weight loss products for
women. None of this proved to be true as
the sellers were distributing fake pills and the
Federal Trade Commission took legal action
against the company that was using Kelihos
for advertising at that time, leading to a $43
Million settlement against Sale Slash, LLC
[Commission, 2016].
This was the time when it was thought that
Kelihos, known as Waledac at that time, was
dead. As the saying goes “the game is not
finished until the final bell”, Kelihos returned
stronger and continued to spam people all
over the world.
In 2009, when Waledac was a dominant
force, it started to shift its spam pattern
from SMS spy cam to Canadian Health &
Care Mall and Canadian Pharmacy. These
were websites where the user can buy Viagra
pills for less than a dollar, but these were
fake pills.
After the takedown of the Waledac botnet
in 2011 by Microsoft and Kaspersky, Kelihos
came into existence [Meisner, 2011]. A press
release alleging a Russian citizen can be seen
in Figure 23.
The attribute that related both Waledac
and Kelihos is the similarity between the
source code and the product being spammed.
Since 2009, Kelihos is spamming links to
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Figure 22. Timeline of recent Kelihos botnet spam campaign
Figure 23. Sabelnikov alleged to operate and
control the Kelihos botnet
Canadian Health & Care Mall for the ma-
jority of its spam.
Figure 24. Snapshot of Canadian Health & Care
Mall
4.1.1 Domain Names
When the Kelihos botnet is spamming URLs
for pharmaceutical products, the URL used
in the spam does not point directly to the
pharmaceutical website, but rather to a redi-
rector site. However some domains have
been used consistently over a period of many
months, including those listed in Figure 25 25.
Researchers used these domain names as bea-
cons to identify spam-sending IP addresses
infected with Kelihos.
The domains displayed in Figure 25 are
different and recurring at times in the spam
campaign.
Figure 25. Domain names spammed by Kelihos
4.2 Pump and Dump Spam
The second most dominant spam affiliated to
Kelihos botnet is pump & dump spam. These
types of campaigns last a couple of weeks on
average. The pump & dump operators trick
people into buying penny stocks advertised in
the spam messages [Bouraoui, 2015] [Nelson
et al., 2013]. The spam promises that the
stock is on the rise and its value will increase
drastically, often with fraudulent or mislead-
ing statements about a new contract, patent,
or discovery that is about to make the com-
pany much more valuable. Generally, these
stocks are priced for less than 50 cents while
some are 10-12 cents. The spam messages
promise closing prices of 3-4 dollars in a short
period of time. Stock symbols spammed by
Kelihos over the last year or so were:
• GRYN Green Hygienes Holdings Inc.
• APTY APT Systems Inc.
c© 2017 ADFSL Page 17
CDFSL Proceedings 2017 Kelihos Botnet: A Never-Ending Saga
• FZRO FlashZero Corp.
• CWTC Clearwave Telecommunication
Inc.
• UPOT Indie Growers Association, Inc.
• SNXG Sunx Energy
Most of the stock symbols were spammed
for a couple of weeks, but a few of them
came back after taking a break. For example,
APTY was first seen on January 22, 2016
and then seen frequently in January, Febru-
ary, and March. It was the most consistent
symbol that was being spammed by Kelihos
botnet for a long period.
4.3 Money Mule Spam
The Kelihos botnet also often sends spam for
money mule or work at home position vacan-
cies. The targets are mostly based on lan-
guage and location. In this particular spam,
the operators seek for unemployed workers or
people looking for a job. They urge the reader
to reply back to an email address with his/her
personal information, promising to pay hand-
somely with flexible work hours. One of the
biggest factors for this spam campaign was
that the employee would have the option to
work from home, which allowed readers to
reply back with their information promptly.
Different languages such as English, French,
Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, and Dutch have
been noted in this particular spam campaign.
Notable organizations like Apple and Wal-
mart were also used in some spam campaigns
to attract readers.
4.4 Credential Phish Spam
Frequently, we encounter multi-language cre-
dential phish. In recent months, the Keli-
hos botnet targets mostly Polish and French
banks, and attempts to steal user credentials
by asking the victim to verify their informa-
tion via clicking a link. The link leads to a
phishing website and tries to steal the victims
username and password. An example of such
an email was documented in April 2016 and
can be seen in the figure 26:
Figure 26. Polish Bank Phish Email
4.5 Kronos Banking Trojan
An interesting thing that was observed on
November 9, 2016 was that, in addition to
spamming the world, the Kelihos binary be-
haved covertly and dropped Microsoft Word
document on the infected machines desk-
top[Arora & Warner, 2016e]. The document
name can be viewed in Figure 27.
Figure 27. Pictorial view of the document link
on the infected user’s desktop
The intention was to surprise the user and
hope that the document will be viewed out
of curiosity. As expected, the ‘oldversion.doc’
was a malicious document and after click-
ing ‘Enable Content,’ it downloaded Kronos
banking trojan malware. This was confirmed
with Figure 28 that contains a string found
in Ollydbg
Figure 28. Confirmation of Kronos malware with
the help of OllyDbg
5. RANSOMWARE
5.1 WildFire Ransomware
The latest addition to the Kelihos botnet
was WildFire Ransomware. On July 8, 2016,
a Kelihos sample was encountered that was
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sending a Dutch-language spam with a link
to a Microsoft Word document [Arora &
Warner, 2016b]. The behavior has never
been seen before and it was the first time
that Kelihos botnet was distributing links to
ransomware. Ransomware has evolved dras-
tically and seems to be the most profitable
form of malware distributed by malware au-
thors. Through a single click on a malicious
link or enabling a macro script, the malware
has the ability to encrypt all the files on a
victim’s machine and requests a payment in
return for decrypted files. Figures 29 and
30 display the original email in the Dutch
language and its translation to English.
Figure 29. Word document link being dis-
tributed in the email
Figure 30. Word document email translated in
English
In this particular case, the message informs
the user of an unsuccessful package delivery.
The user is required to fill a form in order
to reschedule the delivery and is requested
to click the embedded link to download a
Microsoft Word document. Once the Word
document opens, the document is presented
in “Protected View” and requires “Enable
Editing”.
Figure 31. Word document in protected view
Once enabled, it followed a similar pro-
cess required by most hostile macro scripts
“Enable Content”. After fulfilling all require-
ments by the Word document, the macro
leverages a connection with its command and
control center in order to encrypt the files
on the machine. The process can be better
understood with help of Figures 31, 32 and
33
Figure 32. Word document asking to enable
content
Figure 33. Wildfire Encryption Ransomware
ransom note
Different payment sites are listed where the
user can pay the ransom amount in Bitcoin
and receive the decryption key. This was
a significant change for the Kelihos botnet
given that it normally targets victims with
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less aggressive methods. The introduction of
ransomware made the long lasting Kelihos
botnet extremely treacherous.
5.2 CryptFile2 Ransomware
On August 4, 2016, another interesting addi-
tion to the long-lasting Kelihos spam was that
American Airlines themed spam messages de-
livered Microsoft Word documents, which
eventually delivered CryptFile2 ransomware
[Arora & Warner, 2016a]. The ransom note
is mentioned in Figure 34
Figure 34. CryptFile2 Encryption Ransomware
ransom note
5.3 No More Ransom
Ransomware
On November 30, 2016, Kelihos spammed a
wide variety of payloads, including a banking
trojan, credential phishing, and a new ran-
somware variant. The criminals altered their
malware to change the extension of encrypted
files to “.nomoreransom” poking fun at the
“No More Ransomware” campaign [No More
Ransom, 2016] started by National High Tech
Crime Unit of the Netherlands police, Eu-
ropol’s European Cybercrime Centre, Kasper-
sky Lab, and Intel Security. Rather than
being cowed by the new public service cam-
paign, the criminals challenged them. This
particular spam campaign was geo-targeting
Australian email addresses ending in ‘.au’
with a lure impersonating Bank of America
to trick the users to believe that the spam is
legitimate and coming from a well-established
corporation.
5.3.1 Inauguration of JavaScript
In this campaign, the infection vector
changed from a Microsoft Word document
to a JavaScript file. Clicking the link in the
email downloaded a zip file which contained
a small JavaScript program [Arora & Warner,
2016f]. The necessary details of the zip file
are visible in Figure 35
Figure 35. Downloaded zip file containing Java
Script
After the JavaScript is executed, the mal-
ware contacts the command and control cen-
ter and encrypts the file system. Afterwards,
it displays the following ransom note, noted
in Figure 36, in Russian as well as in English.
Figure 36. Ransom note of Troldesh ransomware
in Russian and English
As can be seen in the ransom note,
the extension of the file is changed to
‘no more ransom’. On further analysis, it
was found that it was ‘Troldesh’ ransomware.
5.3.2 Pony Info Stealer Malware
After encrypting the files on the victim’s ma-
chine with the Troldesh ransomware, the mal-
ware also downloaded the Pony information
stealer malware. This behavior is unique and
has never been associated with Kelihos mal-
ware. Even though the files are encrypted,
the malware still wants to acquire additional
information from the victim’s computer. Fig-
ure 37 depicts the admin page of Pony mal-
ware.
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Figure 37. Pony Info Stealer Malware Admin
Panel
6. GEO-TARGETED
SPAM
6.1 Europe Geo-Targeted
with Panda Zeus
Perhaps the clearest example of geo-targeting
comes from a set of spam campaigns con-
ducted on August 12, 2016 by Kelihos. The
botnet was geo-targeting based on the top
level domain of the recipient’s email addresses
[Arora & Warner, 2016d]. Some examples of
the specific targeted spam campaigns were:
• If you are a “.de” you get “German bank-
ing” spam that drops a Word doc that
leads to a Panda Zeus infection
• If you are a “.co.uk” you get “British
banking” spam that drops a Word doc
that leads to a Panda Zeus infection
• If you are a “.it” you get invited
to start a romance with lyudmilafe-
doji@gmail[.]com
• If you are anyone else, you get pill spam.
The Zeus banking trojan is well-known
among the information security community.
Zeus is a form of malware that targets various
operating systems and tries to steal financial
data; especially, banking information, credit
card, social security, and so on [Kaspersky,
2010]. While this seemed a dramatic change
in the Kelihos botnet spamming techniques,
it is merely a sign of the “Spam as a Service”
model used by Kelihos. Any malware ac-
tor can hire the Kelihos spammers to deliver
their message or payload. The same mecha-
nism, as previously mentioned, was used to
spread several different malware campaigns
and target the geographies desired by the
customer.
6.2 Canada Geo-Targeted
with Desjardins Phish
On August 16, 2016, another example of geo-
targeting was observed. Email addresses end-
ing with “.ca” were targeted with a French
language spam message for one of many Des-
jardins phishing websites [Arora & Warner,
2016c]. The link advertised in the spam went
was of a credential phishing form, intended
to steal the username and password of users
of Desjardins Bank. The spam message in
French and English is shown in Figure 38.
Figure 38. French Desjardins Phishing Email;
Google Translate
6.3 United States of America
Geo-Targeted with
Nymaim
On August 30, 2016, Kelihos began geo-
targeted US based emails ending with the
top level domain .us by spamming the online
shopping site Amazon. The Kelihos botnet
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was delivering Nymaim banking trojan with
an Amazon Gift Card theme [Arora et al.,
2016]. In this case, the link in the spam body
downloaded a Word document, which down-
loaded a Nullsoft Installer, and eventually
executed the Nymaim banking trojan.
7. BEHAVIOR
It is well known that the Kelihos botnet be-
haves differently based on the network con-
nection type [Yang, 2012]. The behavior
changes in accordance to the network com-
munication and ability to send spam. The
network connections that will be referred in
the following section are:
1. Network Address Translation (NAT) -
Private IP and internal facing
2. Bridged Mode - Public IP and external
facing
7.1 Network Address
Translation
When the Virtual Machine or the infected
computer is in NAT mode, with an IP ad-
dress that is not directly reachable from the
Internet, the Kelihos botnet behaves like a
client or work server. It connects to a sin-
gle node and receives the information. This
means that it receives a single spam template
and sends out the same spam message to ev-
eryone with an identical subject and message
content. A single URL and similar text is
used in the spam message that is distributed
in a single run.
7.2 Bridged
When the Virtual Machine or infected com-
puter is in bridged mode, meaning that it
requests or is assigned a publicly addressable
IP number, the Kelihos botnet drastically
changes its behavior. Kelihos acts as a proxy
server, where it receives not one but many
spam templates and send them in different
directions. Other Kelihos nodes approach
the server to obtain various spam messages
for them to send. In bridged mode, it acts
as a proxy as well as a client; thus, receiv-
ing spam templates and forwarding them to
various other clients or servers.
7.2.1 Credential Exchange
Each Kelihos-infected computer has the ca-
pacity to steal userids and passwords from
the user logged in at that station, particu-
larly focusing on email and FTP credentials.
Stolen credentials are passed upstream to the
C&C server. When a node is in bridge mode,
Kelihos receives some of these stolen creden-
tials to test and logs into various targets using
the FTP addresses and checking for the abil-
ity to write files. The SMTP credentials are
tested and, if they work, are used to send
spam disguising itself as the user whose cre-
dentials were used. Kelihos receives a list
that includes ‘Username’, ‘Password’, ‘From’,
and ‘To’ to be used for the spam message. Af-
ter a successful establishment of connection
and logging into the machine as the user, the
spam is sent out using the same email address
within one or two seconds. Another interest-
ing observation is that the same server IP
address is used for different username and
password logins. Once the email is sent, the
malware logs in with a different account and
keeps on repeating the process. On average,
for a 30 minute run it exchanges approxi-
mately 700-800 FTP and SMTP credentials
combined. With the given quantity, one can
imagine how many credentials are being cir-
culated across the globe. This is one of the
main reasons why Kelihos is considered to be
the most poisonous and resilient spam botnet
in the entire world.
8. FUTURE WORK
While the Kelihos botnet has successfully en-
dured through multiple take-down attempts,
the researchers share everything they learn
about the botnet with law enforcement and
the greater anti-virus community. We will
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continue to document the Kelihos botnet’s
regular spam campaigns and seek a greater
understanding of its infection and communi-
cation methodologies as we train additional
team members and begin to pursue other bot-
nets in a similar fashion. We would welcome
contact with other researchers who would
like to see similar programs adopted in their
research or teaching curriculum.
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